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Considerando que el apoyo a la democracia es uno de los principales factores que determinan la 
consolidación de los regímenes democráticos, en este documento proponemos responder las siguientes 
preguntas: ¿Qué supuestos hacen relevante distinguir distintos perfiles entre quienes no apoyan a la 
democracia?, ¿con base en cuáles argumentos teóricos es posible diferenciar tales perfiles?, y ¿bajo qué 
condiciones se configuran estos perfiles diferenciados de no demócratas? Toda vez que América Latina se 
constituye en un escenario apropiado para responder estas preguntas, hemos utilizado la base de datos de 
Latinobarómetro 2004. En primer lugar, a partir de un análisis de clúster, construimos un indicador que 
nos permite distinguir cuatro perfiles en relación con los apoyos: uno democrático y otros tres no 
democráticos: “autoritario”, “indiferente” e “incoherente”. En segundo lugar, mediante el uso de modelos 
multivariados y variables de nivel individual, demostramos cómo cada perfil de no demócratas se distingue 
respecto del tipo de objeciones hacia la democracia que expresan los ciudadanos. Asimismo, los resultados 
muestran cómo estos perfiles se diferencian a través de los países, sugiriendo la existencia de factores 
endógenos a  cada sistema político -a nivel agregado- que afectan la configuración de estos perfiles.  El 




Actitudes políticas; Legitimidad Democrática; Apoyo a la Democracia; Tipología de “no demócratas”; 
América Latina; Política Comparada. 
 
Abstract: 
Having in mind that support for democracy is one of the most important factors determining the 
consolidation of democratic regimes, in this paper we aim to answer three questions: What assumptions 
does make relevant to distinguish among those who do not support democracy? What are the theoretical 
arguments that allow a differentiation of these profiles? And, under what conditions different non-
democratic citizens’ profiles are constructed? Being Latin America an appropriate scenario of analysis, we 
use the Latinobarometro 2004 dataset. First, based on factor and cluster analyses, we develop an 
indicator that allows to distinguished four different profiles of citizens’ attitudes toward democracy: one 
“democrat” and three non democratic profiles: “authoritarian”, “indifferent”, and “incoherent”. Second, 
using different multivariate models with individual-level variables, we demonstrate that each one of these 
non democrats’ profiles is accounted for different objections to democracy: either exogenous or 
endogenous factors at the system. The paper concludes with some theoretical and political implications 
drawn from the empirical examination. 
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Democracy needs democrats. Citizens‘ support for democracy constitutes a 
fundamental requisite of modern democratic regimes (Hardin, 2007; Lipset, 1959 and 
1994). This legitimacy can be understood as the result of the attitude toward democracy 
which manifests itself as a diffuse or unconditional support for the democratic system of 
government (Easton, 1975). In this sense, democratic legitimacy pertains, as proposed by 
Gunther and Montero (2006: 48), to citizens‘ beliefs that democratic politics and 
representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only 
acceptable) framework for government. Nevertheless, not all the citizens express this set of 
positive attitudes toward the democratic regimen. Indeed, in many emerging and young 
democracies a considerable amount of people either do not give their overt support to 
democracy or show contradictory attitudes toward democratic and non democratic 
governments. This group of individuals has been normally called by the literature as ―non 
democratic‖ citizens considering them as an indistinguishable group. However, as it will be 
shown here, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect the contrary: it is possible 
to find and analyze different kinds of profiles of non democratic citizens and to explain 
their differences based on diverse objections to democracy. 
We aim to propose a theoretical discussion about the relevance of distinguishing 
among those citizens who do not support democracy, following the argument that 
democratic support can be analyzed as a combination of two dimensions: preference for 
democracy and rejection to non democracy. Using multivariate techniques (such as factor, 
cluster, and correspondence analyses), we identify four different citizens‘ profiles, three of 
them accounting of non democratic citizens. In sum, the research questions of this paper 
are: What assumptions does make relevant to distinguish among those who do not support 
democracy? What are the theoretical and empirical arguments that allow a differentiation of 
these profiles? And, under what conditions different non-democratic citizens‘ profiles are 
constructed? 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present the literature 
review about support for democracy and establish the theoretical background of the 
analysis of non democratic profiles. Section III briefly offers the reasons why we consider 
Latin America as an appropriate area of study and describes the dataset used in this paper. 




























































profiles of non democratic citizens. Section V focuses on the hypotheses, the methodology 
and the results regarding our argument of objections to democracy: the characteristics 
which differentiate the non democratic profiles. We conclude with a discussion about the 




























































II. Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
II.1. Support for Democracy 
Citizens‘ support for democracy constitutes a fundamental requisite of modern 
democratic regimes. Understood as the legitimacy of the political order (Lipset, 1959 and 
1994; Hardin, 2007), the mass support given to any democracy—as the most appropriate 
ideal and procedure to govern a society—is an important measure of its stability, 
consolidation and quality (Norris, 1999a; Altman and Luna, 2007). Mass democratic values 
and attitudes are important for all kinds of democracy, either long-time established or 
young ones.  
According to Easton‘s (1975) seminal work, political support has two dimensions: 
the object of support and the nature of this support. That is, it is recognized that ―support 
is not all of a piece‖ (1975: 437) and that it can be displayed in two parallel dimensions. 
Easton establishes, at least, three different objects of political support: the regime, the 
institutions, and the authorities. When referring to the idea of democracy, this support can 
be considered ―specific‖ (conditional) or ―diffuse‖ (unconditional). Thus, it would be 
possible to have negative assessments regarding the conduct of political authorities, whilst 
at the same time maintain positive assessments linked directly with more general and basic 
aspects of the system (see also Norris, 1999a and 2006). 
Diffuse or unconditional support is described as one that relates to what an object 
is or represents not of what it does.1 This kind of support consists in a ―reservoir of favorable 
attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are 
opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants‖ (Easton, 1975: 444). 
Thus diffuse support is expected to be more permanent along time, and independent from 
the outcomes or performance in the short term: ―Outputs and beneficial performance may 
rise and fall while this support, in the form of a generalized attachment, continues‖ 
(Easton, 1975: 444). 
According to this, democratic legitimacy can be understood as the result of that 
attitude toward democracy which—unlike satisfaction with the performance of 
democracy—manifests itself as a diffuse or unconditional support for the democratic 
system of government. In this sense, democratic legitimacy pertains, as proposed by 
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Gunther and Montero (2006: 48), to citizens‘ beliefs that democratic politics and 
representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only 
acceptable) framework for government. If this failed, if the reasons given for the 
worthiness of the political order are not supported and confirmed by autonomous insights 
we speak of illegitimacy (Offe, 2006: 25). 
All the main theories dealing with stability and quality of democracy, which have 
been developing since the late 1970s along with the processes of transition to democracy, 
have underlined the essential role of citizens‘ support for democratic system. From Linz 
and Stepan‘s The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (1978) and Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation (1996) until the more recent literature on the quality of democracy 
(Diamond and Morlino, 2004), the literature on democratic legitimacy has considered 
citizens‘ orientations toward democracy as a principal feature of the stability and well-
functioning of a democratic political regime. According to the literature of consolidation of 
democracy, a popular ―commitment to democratic values, and support for democratic 
system, are necessary conditions for the consolidation of [democratic governance]‖ (Fuch, 
1999: 127). In other words, it is only possible to talk of consolidated democracies when a 
widely normative and attitudinal consensus has been reached regarding the desirability of 
democracy in general, as well as the legitimacy of all representative institutions that have 
been established in the country. 
This broad consensus must be shared by the vast majority of the elites of a 
particular political community (in the government, political parties, intellectuals, and civil 
society), by the grassroots of political, social, and economic organizations, as well as by a 
large majority of public opinion (Chu and Diamond, 1999). In addition, for this support to 
have a consolidator effect it must be unconditional, immune to the political or economic 
contingency, as well as to the ideological or partisan preferences (Torcal, 2008: 30). As 
proposed by Linz and Stepan in a simple but straightforward wording, a political 
community cannot be considered as a safe consolidated democracy until democratic norms have 
become ―the only game in town‖ (1996: 5). In other words, ―Attitudinally, a democratic 
regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that 
democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective 
life in a society such as theirs and when the support for anti-system alternatives is quite 
small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces‖ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 6). 
Although more recently developed, the literature on the quality of democracy 




























































2006; Morlino, 2007) states that reforms with the intention to improve the quality of 
democracy are essential to achieve the wide and persistent legitimacy they need for 
consolidation (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). As it is suggested by Altman and Luna (2007) 
the tonicity of the democratic muscle of a given country does not only depends on the outcomes 
of the performance of institutions, but the quality of democracy life is also about the 
support citizens give to the democratic game. 
In the case of advanced industrialized societies, the consolidated status of mass 
support for democracy has been largely confirmed. In all Western advanced democracies a 
vast and overwhelming majority of citizens express their overt approval for democracy as 
the best and always preferable political regimen of government (Dalton, 1999; Kinglemann, 
1999).2 The well-known story of political support in consolidated democracies is, on the 
one hand, that citizens have a general positive attitude toward democracy as an ideal and a 
form of governance, but, on the other hand, they are unfavourable about the current 
representative procedures as much as their institutions and authorities (Dalton, 2004). The 
emergence of these ―critical citizens‖ (Norris 1999a) or ―dissatisfied democrats‖ (Dalton, 
1999; Lagos, 2003a) shows also that support for democracy is consolidated in terms of its 
unconditionality: ―as citizens are criticizing the incumbents and institutions of government, 
they are simultaneously expressing strong support of the democratic creed‖ (Dalton, 2008: 
252).3 
The story regarding young democracies or countries with recent democratization 
process is somehow different: support for democracy has been considered as one of the 
most relevant, interesting and widely discussed issues. Many emerging democracies still 
have a significant percentage of citizens who have not been persuaded to give their support 
for democracy, and also this support can be very volatile—as the case of the Latin 
American region (Lagos, 1997 and 2003a). Nonetheless, it has been recognized that in 
general terms there is a global aspiration of democracy (Chu et al., 2008; Lagos, 2003b). 
This means that in regions as different as Africa (Bratton, 2002; Bratton and Mattes, 2001), 
East and South Asia (deSouza, et al. 2008; Shin and Wells, 2005), and the Arab countries 
(Jamal and Tessler, 2008; Tessler and Gao, 2005) the levels of support for democracy are 
                                                                
2
 According to Eurobarometer 1997 information, the Western European mean of support for democracy is 
75%, and, with the exception of Portugal, in 14 European countries more than 60% of the citizens prefer 
democracy to any other form of government (Lagos, 2003b: 474). 
3
 However, the other side of the argument is that ―there has been an erosion of public support for the core 
institutions of representative government, including parties and parliaments, in recent decades‖ (Norris, 




























































relatively high, and in many countries is above the theoretical threshold of 60 per cent for 
consolidated regimes (Diamond, 1999; Lagos, 2003b).  
However, this level of democratic support cannot be considered as a triumphal 
achievement of consolidation in all these democracies. Generally speaking in newly 
democratic or hybrid regimes mass support for democracy is not consolidated as long as it 
is not unconditional. As it has been studied, citizens in these countries give their support 
for democracy based on an instrumental calculation: how much they can receive from 
democracy or how much satisfied they are with its performance (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; 
Mattes, 2002; Mishler and Rose, 1999; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2005 and 2008). It means 
that support for democracy can depend on fluctuations of political or economical 
contingencies, and partisan and ideological variations (Lagos, 2008). According to 
Diamond (2002a: 218) in the case of Latin America the unease with democracy is driven by 
the dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, with the discontent with high levels of 
corruption, poor economic performance, and general lack of receptivity of the political 
representatives.  
II.2. Dimensions of Democratic Support: Toward a Distinction of Non 
Democratic Citizens 
Most part of the academic literature about democratic legitimacy has focused on 
the explanations of emergence and stability of unconditional support for democracy in 
different regimes (Bratton, 2002; Chu and Diamond, 1999; Huneeus and Maldonado, 2003; 
Klingemann, 1999; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Teorell, 2002; Torcal, 2008; Watherford, 
1992). Usually this literature develops a ―dichotomous‖ approach, dividing citizens in two 
relatively homogeneous groups: on the one hand, those who overtly support democracy as 
the best political regime (the ―democrats‖) and, on the other, those who do not support 
democratic regime (the ―non democrats‖). 
However, there are at least two arguments which allow considering the group of 
non democrats as heterogeneous. First, there are countries where more than 50 per cent of 
its citizens do not prefer democracy to any other kind of regime, declaring either that in 
given circumstances they would prefer authoritarianism or for them the form of political 
regime does not make any difference. Among those who do not always support democracy 
it is a complex system of attitudes and beliefs, articulated in different kinds of objections to 
democracy. And second, this high level of non preference for democracy is coherent with 




























































that, supporting democracy as a form of government, show values and attitudes different 
from the democratic ideal (UNDP 2004; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007).  
Some authors have recognized the existence of an emerging consensus that 
democratic support is multidimensional (Norris, 1999a and 2006) democrats and 
authoritarians coexist with citizens holding mixed or ambivalent belief systems (Carlin, 
2006; Carlin and Singer, 2007: 2). This is situation, in fact, is not new at all: Almond and 
Verba (1963) recognized decades ago the odd phenomenon that Mexicans, in terms of 
values and attitudes, were neither entirely democrats nor authoritarians, showing a varied 
systems of beliefs (Camp, 2001). However, this was not studied in depth. But only a small 
number of studies have directly addressed the analysis of those citizens who do not support 
democracy and the possible arguments which would explain this attitude. Good examples 
of these are the following. 
Seligson and Carrion (2002) suggest the separated consideration of those citizens 
who place themselves in a middle point of the items they use for measuring support for the 
system. This middle point represents a neutral assessment of the system to which the 
authors called political skepticism. The UNDP (2004) study identifies three main orientations 
of Latin American citizens according to their opinions about democracy: 1) ―democrat‖, 
who responds positively regarding three perspectives: delegative attitudes, preference for 
democracy, and support for representation institutions; 2) ―non democrat‖, who responds 
negatively to the same perspectives; and 3) ―ambivalent‖, who gives ambiguous answers. 
The UNDP Index of Democratic Support allows for the arranging of individuals into 
different categories but using a single dimension scale of support for democracy. Schedler 
and Sarsfield (2007) use cluster analysis and based on direct and indirect measures of 
support for liberal democracy in a sample of Mexican individuals – they find five different 
kinds of ―adjectives‖ to democrats: liberal, tolerant, paternalist, homophobic, and 
excluding; and one additional category of authoritarian. However, their attention is only put 
on those who to a certain extent are classified as democratic citizens. Again, their 
distinction of democratic support is dichotomous, and they do not inquire about 
differences of non democratic citizens. Carlin and Singer (2007) suggest different clusters 
of citizens regarding the support for democracy, developing a set of profiles of supporters 




























































Dahl‘s (1971) Polyarchy. These citizens accept only one main characteristic of democracy.4 
They find, based on a dataset of twelve Latin American democracies, five clusters of 
individuals: democrat; hyper-presidential; pluralist autocrat; hedging autocrat, and pure 
autocrat. 
In addition, there are studies that explain the multidimensionality of democratic 
support from a different perspective. These works propose a distinction of citizen support 
based not on a given concept of democracy—like those reviewed above—but on the 
concept of democratic legitimacy. Morlino and Montero (1995: 233-4) distinguished two 
kinds of democratic legitimacy: ―diffuse legitimacy‖, understood as the general and abstract 
framework of positive attitudes toward democracy, and ―legitimacy by default‖ recognized 
as the support for democracy when the alternatives of democracy are not view positively. 
In the same layer, Chu and Huang (2007) claim that factors shaping people‘s positive 
orientations toward democracy are not the same as those moulding people‘s attitudes 
toward authoritarian alternatives.5 The authors find that, although both aspects are 
indispensable for the development of a solid attitudinal consolidation of democracy, these 
two sets of orientations are conceptually and empirically distinguishable. Rejection to 
authoritarian options does not imply necessarily support for democracy.  
In this paper, we debate neither the definition of democratic legitimacy nor the 
precise concept of democracy. We do not intend to discuss either the methodological 
validity or the reliability of the indicators trying to measure these concepts. However, we 
work on the boundaries of this discussion, in the sense that we expect to understand the 
situation where different citizens cohabit with mixed and ambivalent attitudes and values 
toward democracy. Regarding the previous theoretical elaboration, we recognize two 
things: first, any kind of indicator of individual political support has to consider the 
multidimensionality of this attitude and the possibility of ambiguous sorts of support. And 
second, this indicator has to take into consideration not only the abstract support or 
preference for democracy (including the beliefs as the best form of government) but also 
opinions about the authoritarian options. Thus in the analysis of different profiles it is 
necessary to differentiate two dimensions: preference for democracy over any other kind of 
                                                                
4
 They analyze individual support for: political tolerance, free expression, civil liberties, and institutions and 
processes.  
5




























































regime and rejection to non democratic alternatives, either authoritarian or non-completely 
democratic ones—that has been defined as delegative democracies or hybrid regimes.6 
                                                                
6
 The concept of ―delegative democracy‖ was developed by O‘Donnell (1994). Recently, some scholars have 
suggested that the spectrum of differentiation among political regimes goes beyond the simple distinction 
between democratic and authoritarian, and they have proposed the alternatives of ―hybrid regimes‖ 
(Diamond 2002; Karl 1995), ―illiberal democracies‖ (Zakaria, 1997) or ―competitive authoritarianisms‖ 
(Howard and Roessler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002). These political regimes are 
characterized by having the (theoretical) minimum component of a democracy: relatively free and fair 
elections, where political options compete for public positions, but where the rather necessary characteristics 




























































III. Why Latin America? Selection Reasons and 
Data 
This research is focused on the new Latin American democracies. All these 
countries have a similar historical background, but diverse current political and social 
trajectories, with different political cultures and institutional settings. Precisely because of 
this situation, the region is very appropriate for a comparative analysis: analogous previous 
conditions and experiences, but diverse results, where support for democracy is not the 
exception. 
As it has been stated before, low levels of democratic legitimacy are considered as 
one of the main problems for the emergence and consolidation of a democracy, as much as 
its quality. On average, and more than two decades after democratic transitions, the great 
majority of Latin American countries still show relatively low and volatile levels of support 
for democracy, compared to those from the established advanced Western democracies as 
well as emerging democracies of other regions. 
In Table 1 it is possible to see a great variation among countries in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa. In one extreme, in countries like Nigeria, Thailand, Tanzania, and Uruguay 
more than 80 per cent of its inhabitants manifest their preference for democracy; on the 
other extreme, in Mongolia and Paraguay only 40% of its population expresses the same 
support. Comparing regions, African mean is above 75%, meanwhile Asian and Latin 
American means are close to 60%.7 Thus, democratic support in these two regions is 
relatively low, but in Latin America the variance among countries is larger.  
Besides, in Latin America the situation is rather problematic because democratic 
support is not only low, but it has considerable fluctuations across time. Figure 1 shows 
that support for democracy oscillates between 58% in 1995, 67% in 1997, 55% in 2001, 
and 58% in 2008. Just between 1996 and 1998 it has been above the theoretical threshold 
to be considered as a consolidated democracy (Diamond, 1999). Therefore, support for 
democracy in Latin America is neither substantial nor unconditional.  
 
                                                                
7 The information of European countries also reveals great variation: the mean of support for democracy in 




























































Table 1. Preference for Democracy in Latin America, Africa and Asia 
Region / Country 
Preference for 
Democracy (%)* 
Region / Country 
Preference for 
Democracy (%)* 
Latin America 60 Africa 74 
Uruguay 82 Botswana 87 
Venezuela 77 Tanzania 83 
Costa Rica 74 Uganda 83 
Dominican Rep. 74 Nigeria 81 
Panama 70 Zimbabwe 78 
Argentina 67 Zambia 78 
El Salvador 66 Ghana 76 
Chile 59 Namibia 71 
Mexico 57 Malawi 67 
Bolivia 54 Mali 59 
Colombia 53 Lesotho 53 
Honduras 52 Asia 59 
Peru 51 Thailand 81 
Nicaragua 50 Indonesia 73 
Guatemala 50 Singapore 63 
Brazil 48 Filipinas 55 
Ecuador 48 Taiwan 51 
Paraguay 40 South Korea 48 
  Mongolia 40 
Source: For Latin America: Latinobarometro 2004, for Africa: Afro barometer 2005 and for Asia: Chu & 
Huang 2007: 30 (with information from Asia barometer 2005-2007). 
* Percentage of respondents who choose the option ―Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of 
government‖. D.K. and D.A. answers were codified as Missing values.  
 
In order to analyse a broad set of countries, we use the Latinobarometro dataset of 
2004. With this survey it is possible to analyse eighteen countries in the region. Also, the 
survey contains important questions in order to build the indicator and the test different 
hypotheses. The Latinobarometro2004 is based on 19,605 personal interviews, carried out 
between May 1st and June 29th, comprising representative samples of 1,000-1,200 cases in 



































































Figure 1. Support for Democracy in Latin America, 1995-2008 
 
Source: from 1995 to 2005, datasets of Latinobarometro; from 2006 to 2008: media annual reports 
Latinobarómetro (www.latinobarometro.org). We present the percentage of individuals agreeing with one of 
three statements in the question of regime preference. 




























































IV. Identification of Non Democratic Profiles: 
Methods and Indicator 
To be consistent with the theoretical discussion, the indicator of different profiles 
of non democratic citizens has to fulfil two methodological characteristics. First, it has to 
include more than one simple variable or question, because support for democracy ought 
to be analysed from a multidimensional perspective. Second, the indicator has to be 
constructed with different categories or profiles.8 In that sense, the preliminary step is to 
identify and corroborate the two dimensions of support: preference for democracy and 
rejection to authoritarianism (or non democratic regimes). Without hesitation, the 
appropriate technique for this purpose is the confirmatory factor analysis. This method will 
provide us with, for the selected variables, the individual scores for the two dimensions.  
The characteristics and codification of the selected variables are shown in Appendix 
I at the end of this paper. For the dimension of preference for democracy, we selected 
different questions about the benefits of democracy as the best system of government. The 
first one is the ―overt support for democracy‖, which asks about the preference for 
democracy compared to other options.9 Unlike the great majority of studies, we 
incorporated this variable without transforming it into a dichotomised or a continuous one 
maintaining its three nominal categories, as we estimate the item has a great discriminatory 
capacity for those who do not prefer democracy. For the dimension of rejection of 
authoritarianism the Latinobarometro allows us only to selected items related with rejection 
of military rule.  
The correlation matrix of the five variables for the whole Latin American sample 
suggests that the associations among them are statistically significant in the expected 
manner. In addition, the coefficient of Cronbach-alpha—0.60, computed only for the 
                                                                
8
 An indicator measuring support for democracy in a continuous manner supposes that in one extreme one 
should find the ―democrats‖—giving the most positive opinion to all the selected variables of support—and 
in the opposite extreme there will be located the ―non democrats‖—declaring the most negative opinion to 
the same variables. However, this makes it difficult to study the individuals located in the middle of the 
scheme (Carlin and Singer 2007). Using a simple factor analysis (which in its bases implies the linearity of the 
variables) to construct the indicator seems not to be the best methodological tool as we are working on the 
theoretical basis that individuals can express contradictory and mixed preferences for democracy; in other 
words, we aim to find non linear relationships. 
9
 This item has been used in several public opinion surveys. Its theoretical background has been recognised in 
the arguments of the breakdown of democratic regimen‘s theory postulated by Juan J. Linz (1978). He made a 




























































dichotomous variables—adds evidence of the multidimensionality structure of our data. 
According to the latter, we compute a factor analysis with dummy variables in order to 
confirm the existence of the concepts of preference for democracy and rejection of 
authoritarianism. The result, shown in Table 2, illustrates clearly how the four variables are 
divided into two different factors as predicted, with a correlation of 0.68 (and a Cronbach-
alpha coefficient of 0.8). Hence, even if the preference for democracy and the rejection of 
authoritarianism are theoretically and empirically distinguishable, both are correlated. 
 









Democracy better system of 
government 
- 0.5119 0.732 
Democracy best for 
development 
- 0.5115 0.732 
Rejection to military 
government 
0.7061 - 0.500 
Problem solving capacity of 
military government 
0.7025 - 0.496 
Note: Only factor loads over  <0.2 are shown. 
*Rotated factors (promax method).  
 
The next step is to construct the citizens‘ profiles. In the same vein of previous 
works (Carlin and Singer, 2007; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; UNPD 2004), the best 
methodological technique to obtain different individual profiles of support is the cluster 
analysis. This method allows identifying different groups or clusters among observations or 
individuals according to their variation in different variables. The technique minimizes the 
difference among individuals within the same group and maximise dissimilarities between 
groups. The cluster analysis will group individuals in different profiles along with their 
similarities in the orientation toward democracy, according with two dimensions above 
mention.  
For the cluster analysis we have used three indicators: the scores of the two factors 
previously obtained and the item of preference for democracy. We transformed the latter, 
considering its categories, into three new dummy variables (1=each category and 0=the 
other two) and standardized it (mean=1, and standard deviation=1) in order to facilitate 




























































procedure of partition10 that—unlike the normal hierarchical models of agglomeration—
allows us to set the number of clusters we are interested in identifying.  
With the aim of confirming that the four profiles are well adjusted to our sample, 
we computed other analysis with the same method specifying different solutions: two, 
three, and six clusters. Using the Calinski and Harabasz pseudo-F index for cluster-analysis 
stopping rule, we confirm that the solution of four groups is indeed the best fitting the 
dataset. This four-cluster solution presents the higher pseudo-F index compared to the 
other possibilities. In addition, we compute another cluster analysis, but this time we tried 
one hierarchical analysis of agglomeration11 with average linkage for a sub-sample of the 
Latinobarometro dataset.12 The dendogram derived of the analysis shows three different 
solutions: three, four, and six clusters. Giving the fact that hierarchical models allow 
another cluster stopping rules, we calculate the Duda-Hart Je(2)/Je(1) index. Presented 
with the Duda-Hart Je(2)/Je(1) values are assigned pseudo-T-squared values. Smaller 
pseudo-T-squared values indicate more distinct clustering (StataCorp., 2007: 159). 
Comparing the results of our sub-sample analysis, we found that the 4-cluster and the 6-
cluster solutions have the smallest pseudo-T-squared values. All these results combined 
with the theoretical framework give us consistent arguments to accept that the four-cluster 
solution is the most appropriate.  
The solution provides us with an indicator of different individual groups. First of 
all, we have to mention that the conventional variable of support for democracy has the 
best discriminating capacity. It is shown that each profile is dominated by one of the three 
possible categories: the 100% of individuals in each group choose one category. The result 
confirms that this question is a useful instrument distinguishing among democratic 
supporters. However, it cannot be taken alone as it will be demonstrated in the following 
analysis. Table 3 demonstrates some distinctive characteristics of each profile that are 
useful in order to name them. This indicator joint with the distribution of the mean of the 
variables used in the cluster analysis allows us the opportunity to identify four profiles of 
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 This method of partition divides the observations into a not superimposed number of groups. The average 
linkage procedure (also known as arithmetic average clustering) uses the distance between two or more 
groups as the mean of the distances between all pairs of observations between the two groups. 
11
 The hierarchical agglomeration models do not assume any particular number of groups to form. They start 
considering each observation as a separated group. The most proximate groups are combined, and this 
process continues until the whole pool of observations is assigned to one group or cluster. There are different 
methods of linkage: nearest-neighbor or simple method; arithmetic average clustering (the one used in this 
paper); and furthest-neighbor or complete method. 
12





























































citizens: ―democrat‖, ―authoritarian‖, ―incoherent‖, and ―indifferent‖, as it can be seen in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Profiles of Support for Democracy: 4 Clusters solution 
Variables 
Profiles of Support for Democracy  
Democrat Authoritarian Incoherent Indifferent 
Sample 
Mean 
Democracy best form 
of government 
0.93 0.60 0.77 0.68 0.78 
Democracy best for 
development 
0.93 0.62 0.76 0.72 0.79 
Rejection to military 
government 
1.00 0.50 0.31 0.64 0.70 
Problem solving 
capacity of military 
1.00 0.50 0.30 0.61 0.69 
―Democracy is always 
preferable‖ 
1.00 0 1.00 0 0.60 
―Authoritarian 
government can be 
preferable‖ 
0 1.00 0 0 0.16 
―It doesn‘t matter we 
have a democratic or 
non democratic gov.‖ 
0 0 0 1.00 0.22 
Note: We presented the mean of each variable that we have used in the construction of the dimensions of 
―preference for democracy‖ and ―rejections to authoritarianism‖ for each profile and for the whole sample of 
individuals. 
 
The democrat profile is characterised by individuals who overtly prefer democracy 
and reject the military/authoritarian alternative as well. They also reckon almost completely 
that democracy is the best form of government and the best system for development. The 
authoritarian profile describes individuals who, under certain circumstances, would prefer an 
authoritarian government. Half of these individuals do not reject the military government. 
Also, in a lower proportion they think of democracy as the best form of government and 
for development. The profile called incoherent is featured with individuals who always prefer 
democracy but with an inconsistency: they do not reject in majority the authoritarian rule 
(the mean of this variable for the profile is 0.30). However, compared to the authoritarian, 
the incoherent has a better esteem of democracy as the best form of government, right 
after the democrat. Finally, the profile of indifferent is dominated by individuals for whom 




























































great proportion the authoritarian government. And compared to the incoherent, his or her 
appreciation of democracy as the best form of government is slightly lower.13 
Alternatively, in Figure 2 we present the distribution of the profiles for the whole 
sample and for each Latin American country. At first glance, the profiles vary cross-
nationally. On the one hand, not surprisingly, Costa Rica and Uruguay have the greater 
number of ―democrats‖. On the other hand, the distribution of non democratic profiles 
differs very much across countries. For instance, Paraguay is the case with the highest 
number of ―authoritarians‖; the ―indifferent‖ is the most relevant profile in Nicaragua; and 
El Salvador concentrates the largest amount of ―incoherents‖.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Citizens’ Profiles in 18 Latin American Countries 
Source: Authors‘ elaboration based on information from the Indicator constructed in this paper with data 
from the Latinobarometro 2004. We sort countries according to the percentage of ―democrats‖. 
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 In order to test whether the four-cluster solution remains the finest we replicate the distribution of profiles 
according to the means of the selected variables for the six-cluster solution. See the Table 4 (Appendix II) for 
this. It is possible to see that three profiles—democrat, authoritarian, and indifferent—maintain the same 
characteristics. However, it appears another possible profile of moderate democrat and the incoherent seems to 
be divided into the profile we have already described and another radical incoherent. We reckon this result 
sustains the appropriateness of the four-profile solution because this one of six-profiles does not change 




























































In order to classify the countries according to the distribution of profiles, we run a 
correspondence analysis.14 With the graphic assistance of the correspondence map (see Figure 
3), we can postulate a first classification of countries in four groups. The result suggests 
that 89.5% of the variance between profiles and countries can be explained by two axis or 
dimensions. Dimension 1—from left to right—seems to be dominated by the distinction 
between the democrat profile and the non democrat profiles (66% of the explained 
variance). Dimension 2—from top to bottom—distinguishes between non democrat 
profiles: the ―authoritarians‖ in one extreme and the ―indifferents‖ and ―incoherents‖ on 
the other extreme (23% of the explained variance). 
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Source: Authors‘ elaboration with data from Latinobarometro 2004. 
 
We identify one group of countries characterised for relatively proportional 
distribution of the four profiles: Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and, to a certain extent, Argentina 
                                                                
14 The correspondence analysis is a proper technique for the study of categorical variables and the analysis of 




























































(but this country has a bigger proportion than the others of democrats and it is located on 
the negative scores of Dimension 1). The second group is constituted by Paraguay and 
Ecuador at the left bottom of the map, meaning a strong presence of the authoritarian 
profile. A third group is recognized by the large amount of democrats, and this includes 
Costa Rica and Uruguay, and also Chile, Dominican Republic, Panama, and Venezuela, 
however these countries have important groups of indifferents and incoherents. The last 
group is formed with the cases without an important number of democrats, but where the 
authoritarians are not relevant either. Mexico and Nicaragua are rather associated with the 
indifferents; and El Salvador with the incoherents. Finally Colombia, Guatemala and 
Honduras tend to have similar proportions of these two profiles. 
Without hesitation, the patterns of distribution and association between profiles 
and countries are very interesting. However, the purpose of analysing these patterns goes 
beyond this paper as we intent to build and present a useful indicator of non democratic 
profiles. In the following section, we examine the possible factors which account for the 
configuration of different profiles: that is, the objections to democracy that citizens of non 




























































V. Analysis and Explanation of Non Democratic 
Profiles: Hypotheses and Methods 
As shown by a large amount of literature, support for democracy seems to be 
driven by more or less clear-cut factors, while the objective to explain its rejection remains 
much more complicated (Carlin and Singer, 2007: 15). Tapping objections to democratic 
rule entails a different kind of problematique than measuring diffuse support for democracy: 
―knowing that a person has little esteem for democracy, or low level of diffuse support, is 
not the same as knowing what kind of objections to democratic rule he or she has, and 
what kind of antidemocratic political actions he or she is willing to tolerate and/or 
support‖ (Vargas Cullell, 2006: 2). Therefore, it is necessary not only to demonstrate that 
there are different kinds of citizens‘ profiles, but also—and more important—that these 
profiles are distinguishable and explained by different factors. 
In the context of the democratic consolidation literature, a set of different 
hypotheses with the aim of accounting for the generation and maintenance of support for 
democracy has been formulated. However, in this literature there is not any sort of 
proposition explaining non democratic support, which is the aim of this paper. With regard 
to the former, we assume that explanations of democratic support can be a suitable starting 
point. Those hypotheses can be grouped in two kinds of explanations: exogenous and 
endogenous to the political system. The first ones suggest that the factors accounting for 
citizen support are external to the political system, whilst the second kind of explanations 
predicts that this support depends on the political system itself. 
Among the exogenous hypotheses, it is possible to highlight first the cultural 
approaches, which refer to cultural traits depending on long time processes of socialization 
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Lerner 1958; Lipset, 1959). Thus, at the micro level, these 
models pose that individual‘s preferences of the regime would be strongly influenced by 
norms and values (Mattes and Bratton, 2007): the change from a traditional and 
communitarian (even ethnical) culture to a modern and individual one explains support for 
democracy. Here we use the variables of ―political values‖, ―democracy as a government by 
agreement‖, and ―social conservadurism‖.15 A second group of exogenous explanations 
refers to the socioeconomic structure. These theories sustain that individual preferences 
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and behavior are determined by material circumstances, as socio-demographic, social class, 
and social structural variables (Moreno, 2001). The proposition behind these theories is 
that, in a first moment, economic development raises the levels of tolerance, interpersonal 
trust, political activism, and the defense of individual liberties (what Inglehart, 1990 and 
1999, and Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; called the ―post-materialist syndrome‖); then, all this 
elevates the levels of democratic support. The selected variables for these hypotheses are: 
gender, age, education, and income. 
Endogenous explanations are rather based on the reasoning of individuals. From 
this perspective, citizens‘ preferences and attitudes would be the result of political or 
economic events, and consequence of different conflictive experiences, as well as the result 
of institutional design factors, the evaluation of institutional performance (Mattes and 
Bratton 2007; Norris 1999) or the legacy of previous authoritarian regimes (Morlino, 2007; 
Torcal, 2008). One part of this literature proposes that the formation of democratic 
individual preferences depends on a rational and pragmatic evaluation of the economic 
government performance (Przeworski, et al. 2000). Citizens prefer democracy because it 
works for them and gives them greater benefits (Evans and Whitefield, 1995). In order to 
test the proposition we use the variables of satisfaction with national/domestic and 
personal economy and general approval of government. Some other scholars propose that 
citizens define their preferences based on ―political goods‖: individuals defined a rational 
preference for democracy based on their positive evaluation of the political performance of 
the system. Then, support for democracy depends as much on the satisfaction with the 
democratic regime as the performance of certain political institutions and authorities 
(O‘Donnell, 2004; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2005 and 2008). In that sense, we employ the 
variables of satisfaction with the way democracy works and the perception of reduced 
corruption in the government. Some other scholars suggest that, especially in newer 
democracies, rationality does not depend so much on economic and political goods as in 
the individual calculation influenced by the comparison between regimes (Mishler and 
Rose, 1999). No matter how satisfied people are with the economic and political 
performance of the government, they are eager to support democracy because it works 
better than its predecessors (Morlino, 2007; Torcal, 2008). Although it is an important 
explanation, especially for the cases of this paper, the Latinobarometro does not contain 
useful items to test this hypothesis. 
Some authors propose that political attitudes are determined by the perception of 




























































support would depend on the personal perception of the individual impact upon the 
political process, which is known as political efficacy. This concept has been theoretically 
and empirically studied as composed by other two latent concepts:  ―internal political 
efficacy‖ indicating  individuals‘ self-perception that they are capable of understanding and 
competent enough to participate in political acts, and ―external political efficacy‖, which 
measures expressed beliefs about political institutions, its ―lack indicates the belief that the 
public cannot influence political outcome because government leaders and institutions are 
unresponsive‖ (Miller et al. 1980, 253). In addition, the concept of political efficacy is 
considered as forming part, along with other expressions of political disenchantment, of 
the broader phenomenon of political disaffection which would be affecting support for 
democracy (DiPalma, 1970; Mishler and Rose, 1997). To tap this hypothesis, we use the 
variables of political interest and the reported voting identification. 
A group of theories propose that support for democracy is conditioned by political 
learning processes. In its basis these theories assume that citizens are able to extract lessons 
both from authoritarian and democratic governments, based on their performance (Mattes 
and Bratton, 2007). A successful experience of either autocracy or democracy leaves a 
legacy in individual preferences (Morlino, 2007). These learning processes have three 
forms: 1) ―generational learning‖, where citizen support depends on the generation in 
which an individual has grown and socialized; 2) ―lifetime learning‖, where people acquire 
information during his life and develop attitudes supporting the democratic regime; and 3) 
―collective learning‖, when a whole society experience at the same time the effect of a 
given period or event, and then an individual learns to support democracy no matter his 
generation or age (Torcal, 2008). Unfortunately, the Latinobarometro does not include 
useful questions allowing testing these theories. 
Finally, anticipated by another proposition, some scholars suggest that cultural, 
structural and rational explanations are complementary. In that sense, political attitudes are 
fairly stable cross time, being the result of short term as much as long term. The relative 
importance of each of these factors is essentially an empirical question (Torcal and 
Montero, 2006: 12). Accordingly, our empirical analyses of the configuration of the non 
democratic profiles will test the results of the model including all the variables previously 
discussed, suggesting that attitudes of democratic support are generated by endogenous 
and exogenous factors to the political system at the same time, and its relevance has to be 




























































In accordance with the theoretical and empirical propositions, we propose the 
following hypotheses in the configuration of the non democratic profiles:16 
1. In line with the exogenous explanations, we expect education and income to be 
good predictors of ―democrats‖. In that sense, as long as the ―indifferent‖ is the 
most proximate profile to ―democrats‖, we anticipate that this individuals will be 
more educated than the ―authoritarian‖ and the ―incoherent‖. We also expect 
younger individuals to be either democrat or indifferent—because in general they 
have been socialized during the new democratic rules in the region.  
2. As for the endogenous explanations, we expect that all non democratic profiles will 
be determined to certain extent by a level of dissatisfaction with the regime, either 
economic or political, but we expect a greater effect on, first, ―indifferents‖ and then 
―authoritarians‖. Even if both profiles do not prefer democracy, they both have a 
larger amount of individuals rejecting the military option. In other words, their 
rejection should be highly based on instrumental-rational calculations.  
3. With regard to the former, in the case of ―authoritarians‖ we anticipate this profile 
to be influenced also by cultural factors, especially negative scores of political values. 
Contrary to this, we expect to find that ―indifferents‖ are differentiated by the 
factors of political efficacy because of their lack of attitudinal attachment to the 
body politic. 
4. In the case of the ―incoherent‖ profile, we reckon the non rejection of military rule 
can be influenced by a deep reason, giving the fact that, even when they accept the 
benefits of the democracy as better form of government, they do not rule out the 
authoritarian alternative. We expect this profile to be accounted for cultural 
variables, inasmuch as evaluations of political and economical performance. 
We examine these propositions in two steps. In the first step, the dependent 
variable is the indicator of support for democracy recoded into a dichotomised item, where 
(1) is the ―democrat‖ profiles and (0) the other profiles. We run three models of logistic 
regression for the whole sample: in the first model we used only the socio-demographic 
variables, in the second we test only the cultural, rational and political disaffection 
hypotheses variables, and in the third model we examine the complete effect of all 
variables. The aim of the strategy is to compare separately the influence of the explanatory 
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 All the hypotheses and variables tested in this paper are analysed at the individual level. We decided to 
leave the development of a model considering the systemic and aggregated variables, as it will explained at the 




























































variables in our outcome. The second step develops one model where the dependent 
variable is the same indicator of citizens‘ profile, but maintaining the four categories. We 
use successive multinomial logistic regressions with rotation in the reference category. This 
strategy allows us to analyse the results for each one of the profiles compared to the others.  
Finally, it is necessary to mention that all the models include two additional control 
variables. One is the individual level of ―political information‖ or cognitive awareness, 
because the understanding of the political system is a consequences of the citizen‘ cognitive 
capacities (Mattes and Bratton 2007). The other variable is the political ideology—the 
traditional self position in the left-right spectrum—because some have suggested that 
democratic preferences in Latin America depends on this factor (Lagos 2008; Seligson 
2007; UNDP 2004). 
V.1. Democrat vs. Non Democrat: Nothing New 
The first results of logistic regression are shown in Table 5 with odd ratios and 
robust standard errors.17 In general the three models seem to be well adjusted to our 
propositions; the majority of the coefficients behave as expected and they are statistically 
significant. It is necessary to mention that comparing the pseudo-R-square of each model, 
the model having the best prediction is Model 3 that includes exogenous as well as 
endogenous factors. We also tested the predictability of the model and we found that in 
this model more than 64% of the observations were correctly predicted by this model (see 
the results at the right bottom of Table 5), which is the best result compared to the others.  
The results illustrate that the traditional explanations about the democratic support 
in contrast to non democratic support are sustained. We do not find anything different 
from previous works on this topic. Our results are very similar to those found by Carlin 
and Singer (2007), even though they worked with the profiles of support for polyarchy.  
As it can be seen, democrats are better educated and better informed than non 
democrats. The result of age is intriguing because younger individuals tend to fall in the 
non democrat profile (in other words, the probability of falling in the democratic profile 
increases as the age of individual increases). Also interesting, rational evaluations of the 
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 Instead of reporting the coefficients of the logistic regression, we report the odds ratio of each variable, 
because the values of the exponential terms allow deriving an easy interpretation of the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variables. Considering that all explanatory variables are highly related 
with country characteristics, we run all the models with robust standard error adjusted for 18 clusters 




























































economic situations are not significant in the prediction of profiles. In contrast, the 
variables related with rational evaluation of the political performance of the regime have a 
better significance. However, it is surprising that perception of corruption reduction works 
in the opposite expected direction: relatively the better the performance of government 
against corruption, the higher the probability of being non democrat.  
 
Table 5. Models predicting Democrat Profile versus Non Democratic Profile 






Odds Ratio Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Odds Ratio Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Gender 1.2965 .0380   .9831 .0411 
Education 1.1498*** .0426   1.0790*** .0308 
Age 1.2575*** .0342   1.2622*** .0349 
Income 1.0743 .0503   1.0245 .0375 
Satisfaction with domestic 
economy 
  .9583 .0327 .95589 .0321 
Satisfaction with personal 
economy 
  .9309* .0360 .94324 .0364 
Government approval   1.0509 .0903 1.050* .0874 
Satisfaction with democracy   1.5202*** .1076 1.5298*** .1085 
Corruption reduction 
perception 
  .7929*** .0496 .81095*** .0492 
Political values   1.5897*** .2348 1.6057*** .2343 
Democracy as agreements   2.0457*** .2007 2.0308*** .2159 
Social conservadurism   .6381*** .0572 .63844*** .0542 
Political interest   1.3136*** .0750 1.2813*** .0713 
Voting   1.0073 .0723 1.0070 .0724 
Political information   1.2965*** .0507 1.2414*** .0451 
Political ideology   .9752 .0378 .96697 .0387 
Observations 14,456  11,348  11,187  
Model Chi-squared 307.63***  929.27***  1015.47***  
Pseudo R2 0.0161  0.0696  0.0789  
Sensitivity 23.15%  48.43%  49.37%  
Specificity 85.84%  75.09%  75.86%  
Correctly Predicted 58.79%  63.49%  64.35%  
NOTE: The table lists the odds ratio results of logistic regression with robust standard errors (adjusted for 18 
clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in each model is: (1) Democrat 
profile and (0) Non democrat profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00 
 
In terms of norms and values, as anticipated, democrats prefer freedom and civic 
rights over restricting social order, they think democracy as the space of agreements and 
discussion, and tend to reject the statement of gender segregation. The variable of political 
information gives us a clue about the importance of political efficacy discriminating 
between profiles. Finally, the ideological right-position is not a statistical significant variable 




























































We said before that these results do not give any news about the conventional 
analysis of democratic supporters. However, some questions remain: are these patterns also 
persistent when comparing the different profiles of non democratic individuals? Or, on the 
contrary, each non democratic profile is accounted for different factors? This is the goal of 
the following section.  
V.2. Objections to Democracy: Beyond a Dichotomous Distinction 
The next step it is to demonstrate that the differentiation of non democratic 
profiles is empirically worth. This can only be sustained if each one of the non democratic 
profiles is explained by different factors, and not all by the same—as in the previous part. 
Given the fact that the constructed profiles with our indicator are categories without a 
natural ordering, we analyse their differences computing successive multinomial logistic 
regressions with rotation in the reference category: one for each profile. The results of the 
four multinomial regressions are shown in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9, where we report the relative 
risk ratio (RRR) of each explanatory variable calculated with robust standard errors.18 In the 
following, we comment the results based on each one of the non democratic profiles. We 
characterise them along with the democratic and the other non democratic profiles.  
The ―authoritarian‖ (see Table 7) profile typifies individuals with better education 
than ―indifferents‖ and ―incoherents‖, but without any difference from ―democrats‖—
contradicting the hypothesis that the higher the education, the higher the support for 
democracy. Contrary to our expectation, the probability of being ―authoritarian‖ compared 
to ―democrat‖ decreases as age increases—but the probability increases compared to the 
―indifferent‖. Also authoritarians differentiate from incoherents and democrats based on 
the satisfaction with democracy. Interestingly, the best factor discriminating authoritarians 
from any other profile is the belief that democracy is not a system of agreements, and 
related to democrats and indifferents they are also different on the belief that an orderly 
society is better valuated politically. The authoritarian is more interested and informed than 
the indifferent. According to our expectation, authoritarians have objections to democracy 
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 The RRR of a coefficient indicates how the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group compared 
to the risk of the outcome falling in the reference group changes with the variable in question. An RRR > 1 
indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the risk of the outcome 
falling in the referent group increases as the variable increases. In other words, the comparison outcome is 
more likely. An RRR < 1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the 




























































based on rational evaluation of the political performance of the regime and, more 
important, on differences in political values. 
 
Table 6. Model predicting different Citizens’ Profiles, with reference category: 
“Democrat” 
 Authoritarian Indifferent Incoherent 







Gender 1.0337 .04053 1.0564 .06005 .9715 .05846 
Education .9853 .02419 .8759*** .0.3584 .9260** .02998 
Age .8460*** .02195 .6786*** .03035 .8551*** .02739 
Income 1.0352 .03886 .9744 .05240 .9332* .03396 
Satisfaction with domestic 
economy 
1.0528 .05836 1.0510 .03957 1.0372 .03372 
Satisfaction with personal 
economy 
1.0602 .06257 1.0301 .05103 1.0797 .05713 
Government approval .9331 .09459 .9383 .07562 .9828 .09129 
Satisfaction with democracy .5499*** .05831 .5404*** .02991 .8769*** .05913 
Corruption reduction 
perception 
1.2313** .09507 1.3089*** .09281 1.1654* .10423 
Political values .5315*** .10231 .7683* .11769 .5899*** .08124 
Democracy as agreements .4018*** .04803 .5009*** .05711 .5920*** .06302 
Social conservadurism 1.4634*** .15975 1.6514*** .13314 1.5718*** .16311 
Political interest .8579* .06752 .5879*** .05374 .9041* .04933 
Voting 1.005 .09017 .9225 .07112 1.0538 .08385 
Political information .8405*** .03831 .7389*** .03430 .8363*** .03551 
Political ideology 1.02162 .05977 .9886 .03984 1.0855** .04152 
       
Observations 11,187      
Pseudo R2 0.0601      
NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust 
standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in 
the model is the categories for each Profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00 
 
The profile of ―indifferent‖ (see Table 8) is well characterised by citizens who are 
younger, less educated, and less informed than any other profile. They are also different 
from democrats and incoherent based on his dissatisfaction with the way democracy works 
(a differentiation from democrats potentiated by the disapproval of government). As 
expected, this profile has better appreciation of the democratic norms and values than 
authoritarians and incoherents. The indifferents put objections to democracy based on 
rational or instrumental calculations. And more important, they are a clearly distinguishable 





























































Table 7. Model predicting different Citizens’ Profiles, with reference category: 
“Authoritarian” 
 Democrat Indifferent Incoherent 







Gender .9673 .03793 1.0219 .06417 .9398 .05844 
Education 1.0149 .02492 .8890*** .03213 .9398** .02986 
Age 1.1819*** .03067 .8021*** .03677 1.0106 .02885 
Income .9659 .03625 .9412 .04305 .9014*** .02500 
Satisfaction with domestic 
economy 
.9498 .05265 .9983 .05050 .9851 .04618 
Satisfaction with personal 
economy 
.9431 .05565 .9716 .07804 1.0183 .05271 
Government approval 1.0717 .10864 1.0056 .07556 1.0533 .07847 
Satisfaction with democracy 1.8183*** .19280 .9826 .07233 1.5945*** .12658 
Corruption reduction 
perception 
.8121*** .06270 1.0630 .06812 .9465 .09347 
Political values 1.8811*** .36207 1.4452** .20712 1.1097 .15857 
Democracy as agreements 2.4885*** .29747 1.2467*** .09422 1.4732*** .11795 
Social conservadurism .6833*** .07459 1.1284 .10496 1.0741 .10775 
Political interest 1.1655** .09174 .6852*** .06352 1.0538 .08563 
Voting .9950 .08929 .9179 .06001 1.0486 .06534 
Political information 1.1896*** .05422 .8791*** .03157 .9949 .04193 
Political ideology .9788 .05726 .9676 .03352 1.0625 .04376 
       
Observations 11,187      
Pseudo R2 0.0601      
NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust 
standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in 
the model is the categories for each Profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00 
 
Finally, the ―incoherent‖ profile (see Table 9) is the most difficult to interpret 
because they do not have clear cut patterns. In general terms they are somehow similar to 
the authoritarians, but they differentiate from them in terms of lower income and lower 
education, they are also rather satisfied with the democracy (which is the same case 
regarding the indifferents). The incoherents have interesting differences to the indifferents, 
who tend to be female, less educated, less interested and less informed. Interestingly, they 
are more on the right side of the ideological spectrum compared to the democrats and the 
indifferents. However, our prediction to be a profile clearly discriminated from the other 
non democratic profiles by rather authoritarian values is not corroborated. Nevertheless, 
they seem to be rather dissimilar to the democrats in that sense. They prefer democracy in 
principle and have good rational evaluations of its performance, economically and 
politically, but they do not reject a military regime and have less democratic values. This 
opens the opportunity to consider an additional hypothesis not stated before. Given the 




























































reckon the interaction with cultural, structural and institutional factors in their particular 
countries. Probably the expectation of improving their marginal conditions leads these 
citizens to question the feasibility of democracy in their countries, making them very 
instrumental individuals. However, the limitation of our variables do not allow to test this 
hypothesis at this stage, but it is likely to be explored in a future research. 
 
Table 8. Model predicting different Citizens’ Profiles, with reference category: 
“Indifferent” 
 Democrat Authoritarian Incoherent 







Gender .9465 .05376 .9785 .06144 .9196* .04060 
Education 1.1416*** .04672 1.1248*** .04065 1.0572** .02393 
Age 1.4734*** .06590 1.2466*** .05715 1.2598*** .05139 
Income 1.0262 .05519 1.0624 .04859 .9577 .04216 
Satisfaction with domestic 
economy 
.9513 .03582 1.0016 .05067 .9868 .03660 
Satisfaction with personal 
economy 
.9707 .04808 1.0292 .08267 1.0481 .06630 
Government approval 1.0657 .08588 .9944 .07472 1.0474 .06587 
Satisfaction with democracy 1.8504*** .10242 1.0176 .07490 1.6226*** .08907 
Corruption reduction 
perception 
.7639*** .05417 .9407 .06028 .8904 .09012 
Political values 1.301* .19938 .6919** .09915 .7678*** .05953 
Democracy as agreements 1.996*** .22758 .80211*** .06062 1.1817* .10830 
Social conservadurism .6055*** .04882 .8861 .08242 .9518 .07052 
Political interest 1.7008*** .15548 1.4592*** .13525 1.5377*** .12979 
Voting 1.0839 .08356 1.0893 .07121 1.1423* .09039 
Political information 1.3532*** .06281 1.1374*** .04085 1.1317** .05613 
Political ideology 1.0115 .04077 1.0333 .03580 1.0980** .04290 
       
Observations 11,187      
Pseudo R2 0.0601      
NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust 
standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in 


































































Table 9. Model predicting different Citizens’ Profiles, with reference category: 
“Incoherent” 
 Democrat Authoritarian Indifferent 







Gender 1.0292 .06193 1.0640 .06616 1.0873* .04801 
Education 1.0798** .03496 1.0639* .03380 .9458** .02141 
Age 1.1695*** .03746 .9895 .02825 .7937*** .03238 
Income 1.0715* .03899 1.1092*** .03077 1.0441 .04597 
Satisfaction with domestic 
economy 
.9641 .03134 1.015 .04758 1.0133 .03758 
Satisfaction with personal 
economy 
.9261 .04901 .9819 .05083 .9541 .06036 
Government approval 1.0174 .09450 .9493 .07072 .9546 .06003 
Satisfaction with democracy 1.1403* .07690 .6271*** .04978 .6162*** .03383 
Corruption reduction 
perception 
.8580* .07673 1.0564 .10433 1.1230 .11368 
Political values 1.1064*** .23334 .9011 .12876 1.3023*** .10098 
Democracy as agreements 1.6891*** .17983 .6787*** .05434 .8462* .07755 
Social conservadurism .6361*** .06601 .9310 .09339 1.0506 .07784 
Political interest 1.1060* .06034 .9489 .07711 .6503*** .05489 
Voting .9488 .07550 .9535 .05942 .8753* .06926 
Political information 1.1956*** .05077 1.005 .04235 .8835** .04382 
Political ideology .9212** .03524 .9411 .03876 .9107** .03558 
       
Observations 11,187      
Pseudo R2 0.0601      
NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust 
standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in 






























































VI. Discussion and Future Research 
The results shown are good answers to the question stated in the beginning of this 
paper. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to make a distinction among different 
profiles of non democratic citizens. The proposed indicator of attitudes toward democracy 
constitutes a useful instrument for the study of these profiles, especially for countries 
where democracy has the real challenge to convince and justify its advantages to an 
important number of citizens. We demonstrated that non democratic citizens are not a 
homogeneous group as has been considered by the conventional dichotomous 
classification consequential with the simple opposition with those who do support 
democracy. 
The profiles are distinguished as expected according to the possible combination 
allowed by the two dimensions of support: preference for democracy and rejection to 
authoritarianism. Generally speaking, authoritarians, indifferents, and incoherents are 
clearly distinguishable profiles based on their different objections against supporting 
democracy. The authoritarian profile is configured by non democratic norms and values, 
and their dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. The group of indifferent is easily 
discriminated based on structural, normative and attitudinal grounds. The incoherent 
profile is a rather complex group, being likely very instrumental in his support. 
We have made a contribution to the theoretical discussion about the understanding 
of support for democracy. Contrary to previous works (Carlin and Singer, 2007; Sarsfield 
and Echegaray, 2005; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007) that attempt to make a distinction 
among ―democrats‖ in order to find a better indicator of democratic legitimacy, our 
purpose was not to discuss the conceptual definition of democracy neither to improve the 
measurement of democratic support. Our aim was to inquire about the differences among 
non democratic citizens and their objections to support democracy. From the beginning we 
do not assume a priori any ideal or conceptual form of democracy, and we do not assume 
this given ―type‖ of democracy in citizens when answering the questions we use to develop 
the indicator of individual profiles. We suggest a distinction of citizens directly according to 
the concept of democratic legitimacy, understood as the belief that democracy—whatever 
its definition—is the best system of government in a given moment and for a given 
country. That allows us to study the factors influencing their configurations, the differences 




























































conclusions of previous works on democratic legitimacy, which has been based on a 
dichotomised division between democrats and non democrats.  
Moreover, these results open the opportunity for several lines of future research, 
some of those have been mentioned before. In first place, it is necessary to analyse and 
explain differences between countries. It is not the same that in one case a majority of 
citizens object democracy derived from instrumental reasons than in another case more 
citizens object democracy because normative or socio-structural roots. Taking a look again 
at Figures 2 and 3 one interesting question occurs: Why democrat profile is higher in Costa 
Rica and Uruguay? Or the opposite, why is a large amount of authoritarians characteristic 
in Ecuador and Paraguay? Is it due to contemporary or historic performance of democracy 
in each country? In that sense, some analysts have recommended not to take Latin America 
as a consistent and appropriate region for relevant conclusion; instead the analysis should 
focus rather on individual countries (Lagos, 2008). 
With regard to the latter, the next step is to study the effect of country specific 
factors on the configuration of profiles. These factors correspond also to the endogenous 
and exogenous classification used in this paper. Exogenous explanations, in particular 
socio-structural ones, have sustained that the level of poverty and inequality, the percentage 
of rural population and ethnic fragmentation are good predictors for the lack of support 
for democracy. Endogenous theories explain democratic legitimacy based on the 
institutional setting and the political conditions of each country. For some scholars, the 
relationship between and strength of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial bodies; the 
State territorial structure and its (de)centralization, the electoral and the party system are 
important factors in the emergence and consolidation of positive attitudes toward 
democracy (Norris, 1999b). It has also been proposed that the particularities of the 
previous non democratic regime and the conditions of the democratization process 
configure the current system of democratic legitimacy. Some other analysts suggest that 
support for democracy is a consequence of elite behaviour and institutional quality: 
electoral administrators, campaign regulations, and party reactions—losers‘ consent—can 
shape citizen political attitudes (Anderson et al. 2005; Mattes). A multilevel analysis would 
take advantage of the cross-national dataset. 
Finally, we expect that in future research our findings drive interesting implications 
of the study of charismatic leaderships, support for political parties, or social movements 
(Camp 2001; McAllister 2008; Norris 1999c). Knowing which profiles hide behind the 




























































consequences these configurations of profiles might have for the political system in each 
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X. Appendix I. Codification of Variables. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
For the dimension of preference for democracy, the following questions have been selected from 
the Latinobarometro survey: 
Overt preference for 
democracy 
The variable is categorical. The question and coding as follows. ―With 
which of the following statements you agree most: (1) Democracy is 
always preferable to any other kind of government; (2) Under certain 
circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a 
democratic one; and (3) For people like me, it does not matter whether 
we have a democratic or a non democratic government.‖ 
Democracy is the 
best form of 
government 
The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―Do you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? 
Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of 
government‖. Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and agree; (2) disagree 
and strongly disagree. 
Democracy is the 
best for development 
The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―Do you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? 
Democracy is the only system of government for the development of 
[country]‖. Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and agree; (2) disagree and 
strongly disagree. 
For the dimension of rejection to authoritarianism, the following questions have been selected from the 
Latinobarometro survey: 
Rejection to military 
government. 
The variable is dichotomised. The question and coding as follows. ―(0) 
Would support a military government if the situation got very bad; or (1) 
Under no circumstances would support a military government‖. 
Problem solving 
capacity of military 
government. 
The variable is dichotomised. The question and coding as follows. 
―According to what you know or have heard, can a military government 
can solve more or fewer problems than democratic government. (0) A 
military government can solve more problems; (1) A military government 
can solve fewer problems‖.  
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Socio-Demographic variables: 
Gender The variable is dichotomised: (1) Women, (0) Men 
Education The variable is ordinal. We form seven categories where (1) No studies, 
(2) Basic education incomplete, (3) Basic education complete, (4) 
Secondary of technical education incomplete, (5) Secondary or technical 
education complete, (6) Incomplete university and (7) Complete 
university. 
Age The variable was categorized in different ranges, as follow: (1) 16-25 
years old; (2) 26-40 years old; (3) 41-60 years old; and (4) 61 and more 
years old. 
Income The variable is ordinal. We used the self perception of income. The 
question is: ―Does the salary that you receive and the total family income 
allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the 
following describes your situation:‖ Recoded as follow: (1) It is not 
sufficient, you have big problems‖; (2) It is not sufficient, you have 
problems; (3) It is just sufficient, without major problems; (4) It is 





























































Economic performance evaluation variables: 
Satisfaction with 
domestic economy 
The variable is ordinal. The question is: ―In general, how would you 
describe the present economic situation of the country?‖ Recoded as 




The variable is ordinal. The question is: ―In general, how would you 
describe your present economic situation and that of your family?‖ 
Recoded as follow: (1) Very bad, (2) Bad, (3) About average, (4) Good, 
and (5) Very good. 
Political performance evaluation variables: 
Government 
approval 
The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―Do you approve or 
disapprove of the current presidential administration headed by [name of 
country President]?‖ Coded as follow: (1) disapprove, (2) don‘t know, 
and (3) approve. 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
The variable is ordinal. The question is: ―In general, would you say you 
are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with the way democracy works is [country]?‖ Coded as follow: (1) Not at 




The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―How much progress do 
you think has been made in reducing corruption in state institutions 
during the last two years?‖ The answer coded as follow: (1) Much 
progress and some progress; (0) little and no progress at all. 
Cultural variables: 
Political values The variable is dichotomised. The question asks for preference for one 
of two statements about order and freedom in the society. The 
statements and coding as follows. ―(1) I prefer to live in an orderly 
society although some freedoms may be limited, and (0) I prefer to live 




The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―Do you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? 
Democracy is a form of government where things are resolved through 
discussion and agreement.‖ Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and 
agree; (2) disagree and strongly disagree. 
Social 
conservadurism 
The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―Do you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? It is 
preferable that a woman concentrates on the home and man on his 
work‖. Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and agree; (2) disagree and 
strongly disagree. 
 
Political attitudinal variables: 
Political interest The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―How interested are you 
in politics?‖ The answers are recoded as follow: (1) very interested and 
fairly interested; (0) a little interested and not interested at all.  
Voting The variable is dichotomised. The question is: ―If elections were held this 
Sunday, which party would you vote for?‖ The answers are recoded as 
follow: (1) [any political party mentioned] and blank/null vote; and (0) 
Would not vote and Don‘t know. 
Political information The variable is ordinal. The question is: ―How much would you say you 
know about political and social events in your country?‖ The answers are 
recoded as follow: (1) Nothing, (2) Almost nothing, (3) A littler, (4) A 






























































Political ideology The variable is a scale we transform in ordinal. The question is: ―In 
politics, people normally speak of ‗left‘ and ‗right‘. On a scale where 0 is 
left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?‖ The answers are 
recoded as follow: (1) left, 0-1-2; (2) centre-left, 3-4; (3) centre, 5; (4) 




























































XI. Appendix II 
Table 4. Optional Profiles of Support for Democracy: 6 Clusters solution 
Variables 











best form of 
government 





















0 0 1.00 0 0 0 0.16 
―It doesn‘t 
matter we have 
a democratic or 
non democratic 
gov.‖ 
0 0 0 0 0 1.00 0.22 
Note: We presented the mean of each variable corresponding to the dimensions of ―preference for 
democracy‖ and ―rejections to authoritarianism‖ for each profile and for the whole sample. 
 
